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Hawkins v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 109 (Dec. 28, 2017)1
CIVIL: ATTORNEYS FEES AS SANCTIONS
Summary
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the district court must consider the factors from the
Third Restatement when imposing sanctions in the form of attorney fees on parties.
Background
While at the Meadows Mall, X’Zavion Hawkins, Petitioner, was shot multiple times by
another patron attending an event. He consulted attorney Paul Shpirt to bring a suit concerning the
shooting. Shpirt initially agreed to represent him, but later declined. Hawkins then retained a
different attorney at another firm. Shpirt changed firms and began working at Lewis Brisbois
Bisgaard & Smith (LBBS), a firm retained by Meadows Mall, the defendant in Hawkins’ case.
LBBS screened Shpirt when they learned about the conflict; however, LBBS did not notify
Hawkins of the conflict. Equally important, during discovery, Hawkins was omitting or providing
false information as well as changing his version of the events, so Meadows sought discovery
sanctions and moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court granted the discovery sanctions,
but denied the motion to dismiss.
The district court disqualified LBBS for not notifying Hawkins of the conflict and for
failing to obtain his informed consent.2 Subsequently, Meadows Mall sought attorney fees to
effectuate the order imposing discovery sanctions against Hawkins, and of those fees, $29,201 was
to go to LBBS. Despite Hawkins arguing that LBBS was not entitled to attorney fees because they
were disqualified, the district court granted the attorney fees and ordered Hawkins to pay $41,635
to Meadows Mall, which included $19,846 for work done by LBBS. The district court stated that
it was within their discretion to award attorney fees as sanctions.
Discussion
The Court considered whether the district court “abused its discretion in failing to consider
LBBS’s disqualified status in awarding sanctions in the nature of attorney fees.”3 Under NRCP
37, the district court may impose discovery sanctions, including reasonable expenses and
attorney’s fees.4 However, the district court must also consider the factors outlined in the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 37 cmt. a (2000), which the district court
expressly rejected. The factors to consider when determining a fee forfeiture include the (1) “‘the
extent of the misconduct,’ (2) ‘whether the breach involved knowing violation or conscious
disloyalty to a client,’ (3) whether forfeiture is ‘proportionate to the seriousness of the offense,’
and (4) ‘the adequacy of other remedies.’” The court must consider these factors must be and
weigh them against each other when determining attorney fees as sanctions, and LBBS’s
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disqualified status falls under these factors. Here, the district court rejected the Restatement’s
authority and did not consider these factors when determining the discovery sanctions.
Conclusion
Vacated and remanded. The Court held that a district court must analyze and apply the
factors from the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 37 cmt. d (2000) when
determining the reasonableness of an attorney fees award as a sanction.
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